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Firms are under increasing regulatory pressures to protect consumers’ confidential information. The focus of this 
article is to examine the impact of federal and state breach notification laws in coaxing organizations to improve 
security of customers’ confidential information. Specifically, we use event-study methodology to examine the impact 
of security breach announcements on the market value of firms during the period before and after the enactment of 
this legislation. Our results show that the negative impacts of security breach announcements on stock prices have 
been reduced significantly after the enactment of federal and state security breach notification laws. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Government and the states are responsible for introducing legislation that protects shareholder interests and 
ensures employee work safety. Such laws can have a significant impact on firms by adding constraints to their 
operations and requiring audits to demonstrate compliance [Bartel and Thomas, 1985].
1
  The focus of this article is 
to examine the impact of federal and state breach notification laws in coaxing organizations to improve security of 
customers’ confidential information. Specifically, we use event-study methodology to examine the impact of security 
breach announcements on the market value of firms during the period before and after the enactment of this 
legislation. 
Security breach notification laws have been enacted in the United States since 2002. The first such law, the 
California data security breach notification law, Cal. Civ. Code 1798.82 and 1798.29, was enacted in 2002 and 
became effective on July 1, 2003. As related in the bill statement, the law requires "a state agency, or a person or 
business that conducts business in California, that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal 
information, as defined, to disclose in specified ways, any breach of the security of the data, as defined, to any 
resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, 
acquired by an unauthorized person."  
The enactment of state and federal security breach notification laws is intended to compel firms to disclose to the 
public any incidence of a security breach regardless of its severity or its consequences. While the intended purpose 
is to protect the public, the impact of such laws may have important consequences on firms. We surmise that breach 
notification laws might have an impact similar to that of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [Swartz, 2003; Zhang, 2007], where 
there is a reputational burden on firms resulting from the release of security breach incidents that would impact 
firms. 
The rationale behind the breach notification statutes is twofold: (1) to give individuals a warning and a chance to 
protect themselves and (2) to encourage stronger security measures by requiring firms to publicize their breaches. 
Enacting such laws has significantly contributed to heightened awareness of the importance of information security 
throughout all levels of a business organization. Moreover, enacting these laws helped to inform consumers of the 
need to cautiously manage their identities online. One of the concerns, however, is that the current requirement for 
notifying customers of any breach generates too many breach disclosure letters, which may desensitize customers 
to such announcements.  
The impact of negative events on a firm has been measured by estimating the changes in the market value of firms 
consequent to the event. Generalized conclusions based on specific types of events such as industrial accidents, 
lawsuits, and so on, can be drawn using event studies. Several such event studies are reported in the literature; for 
instance, Broder and Morrell [1991] have used event-study methodology to investigate the impact of industrial 
accidents on the market values of firms. They find a strong negative correlation between such accidents and firm 
valuation. Parmeswaran, Venkateshan, Gupta, Sharman, and Rao [2011] examine the impact of both positive and 
negative cloud computing announcements on the valuations of firms. Gupta, Sharman, and Rao [2010] have used 
event studies to examine the timing of Corporate Crisis Response to Security Breaches and find a significant 
correlation. Campell, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou [2003] examined the impact of security breaches on market values 
and found that firms that experience a breach of “confidential information” experienced a 5 percent drop in market 
value while firms that experience a non-confidential breach had no such impact. Cavusoglu Mishra, and 
Raghunathan [2004] found that on average, firms lose approximately 2.1 percent of their market values within the 
two days surrounding the announcement of a security breach. However, Kannan, Rees, and Sridhar [2007] did not 
find a significant negative return on market valuations due to security breaches.  
                                                     
1
 For instance, the OSHA regulation introduced in 1970, designed to protect employee health and safety, costs industry over $2.7 billion each 
year [Weidenbaum and DeFina, 1978]. Similarly, an HIPAA regul tion that was introduced in 1996 to protect patient information privacy is 
estimated to cost in the range from $3 billion to $43 billion in compliance and enforcement [Artnak and Benson, 2005]. Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 
was enacted in 2002 to improve internal controls and strengthen Corporate Governance practices. Estimates by Zhang [2007] suggest that the 
enactment of this legislation has cost corporations a total of $1.4 trillion in market value. In this particular case, the cost of implementing this 
legislation has been higher than expected [Braganza and Desouza, 2006; Swartz, 2003]. 
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In another case, Goel and Shawky [2009] documented a significant negative impact on the market value of firms 
surrounding the announcement of a security beach, but indicated that the decline is in the order of 1 percent of firm 
value, an amount that is much lower than other studies have found. Hovav and D'Arcy [2004, 2005] have examined 
the impact of security breaches for a limited subset of breaches and conclude that the relative impact of the different 
types of breaches is not clear. Acquisti, Friedman and Telang [2006]
2
 investigated the impact of privacy breaches on 
firms and found a significant negative impact of such breaches on the market value of firms.  
Gordon, Loeb and Zhou [2011] examined whether the impact of security breaches has been declining over time. 
They studied the impact of security breaches on firms in two distinct subperiods and concluded that there has been 
a significant downward shift in the impact of security breaches in the period following the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
relative to the pre-9/11 period. They attributed this downward shift to more effective remediation and disaster 
recovery by firms as well as to a perceived decrease in the tendency of customers to refrain from doing business 
with firms experiencing an information breach. 
Our empirical results indicate that the negative impact of security breach announcements on the stock prices of 
publicly traded firms have been significantly reduced after the enactment of federal and state notification laws. The 
remainder of this article is organized into four sections. In Section II we develop our main hypothesis and our plan of 
testing it. In Section III we provide a detailed description of the data collection process. In Section IV we describe our 
event-study methodology, while in Section V we present our results and discuss their implications. A brief summary 
concludes the article. 
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The incidence of security breaches continues to increase in both public and private organizations. In the past, many 
incidents went unreported due to the reticence of organizations to generate bad publicity or expose their vulnerability 
to potential hackers. To address this issue, mandatory security breach disclosure laws have been adopted by most 
states. These laws require companies to disclose the breaches publicly and inform their customers. Appendix A lists 
all fifty U.S. states plus the District of Columbia, showing their effective adoption dates. Many state regulations 
impose civil or criminal penalties for failure to disclose breach of public information. However, there is considerable 
variation in the laws across the different states [Bingisser, 2008] and there has been some support of a uniform 
federal breach notification law [Picanso, 2006-7]. In any case, the basic purpose remains the same (i.e., to give 
individuals a warning and a chance to protect themselves and to encourage firms to engage in better information 
security practices [Faulkner, 2007]).  
Given the preponderance of empirical evidence regarding the negative impact of security breach announcements on 
firm value, we investigate whether this negative market impact on firm value has been affected by the enactment of 
federal and state security breach announcement laws. Since regulatory legislation can have a significant impact on a 
company’s cash flows, event studies can be used as a metric for measuring the impact of such legislation on firm 
value.  
Event-study methodology has been extensively used for policy analysis and for measuring the impact of legislation 
on firms in several areas including corporate law [Bhagat and Romano; 2002a, 2002b], gaming legislation [Bin, 
Puclik and He, 2009], energy tax legislation [Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1988], Sarbanes-Oxley [Chai, Kim and Rao, 
2011; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Li, Pincus and Rego, 2008 Litvak, 2007; Rezaee and Jain, 2005], and 
corporate governance [Bhagat and Romano, 2002b; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Durnev and Kim, 2005]. 
We hypothesize that the enactment of the security breach notification laws has the potential of influencing behavior 
and could therefore impact stock market prices of impacted firms in two ways. First, it is possible that firms may 
become more careful in preventing such breaches, which may in turn reduce the average aggregate negative effect 
of such breaches on firm value. Second, it is also possible that the increased disclosure of breaches due to these 
notification laws may desensitize investors and the public to such breach announcements, leading once again to a 
reduced impact on firm value. In this article, we test the specific hypothesis that the enactment of security breach 
notification laws might have actually reduced the impact of security breach announcements on firm value. 
III. DATA COLLECTION 
The data on security breach incidents was collected from public sources. A majority of the reported cases involved 
breach of confidentiality. Data collection was done in two steps. In the first step, we collected information on 
                                                     
2
 Telang and Wattal [2007] also conducted a study on disclosure of the vulnerabilities of software vendors and showed that firms lose around 0.6 
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breaches from online sources through the use of search engines.
3
 Existing repositories of breaches were used in 
identifying incidents (e.g., Privacy Rights Clearing House). The incidents were then filtered to identify firms that were 
publicly traded in the United States. Once we obtained the filtered list of incidents, we then looked for company-
specific information through search engine queries and online news repositories such as LexisNexis, Reuters, New 
York Times, and Wall Street Journal.   
The critical data needed for this research included the identification of security breach announcement dates 
collected from various media outlets such as LexisNexis, Wall Street Journal, PC Week, Register, and others. Media 
reports that covered more than one individual security breach were associated with each of the security breaches 
reported. If the news was released on a holiday, we used the following day when the market was open as the event-
study date.
4
 If a single breach incident was published in numerous media outlets, it was considered a single report. 
To avoid contamination of the estimation period, we excluded from our sample any firm that experienced more than 
one security breach within a period of one year. 
The other data needed for the study were the daily stock prices for the firms in our sample that were identified with 
security breach announcements for a period of thirteen months before the breach event and one month after the 
event date. This data was obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The remaining data 
needed to estimate the four factor market model parameters were the CRSP value-weighted market factor, the small 





The efficient market hypothesis asserts that financial markets are informationally efficient, and that stock prices 
reflect all publicly available information.
6
 Thus, using event-study methodology, the impact of security breaches can 
be measured by observing changes in the market value of firms in response to announcements of such incidents. 
This strategy is especially appropriate since market capitalization is a key indicator of firm performance and drives 
many business decisions.  
McWilliams and Siegel [1997, 1999] point out that a well-crafted event study must clearly define the event that 
provides the new information with sufficient theoretic justification. They further note that confidence in the results can 
only be achieved when the abnormal returns associated with the event are correctly identified. Such identification 
relies on the following assumptions: (1) markets are efficient, (2) the event was unexpected by the market, and (3) 
there are no confounding effects during the event window.   
In the context of our study, the new information that was unanticipated by the market was the announcements of 
security breaches. However, we went one step further in this study and attempted to distinguish between the impact 
of such announcements on firm value during the periods prior to and subsequent to the enactment of the security 
breach notification laws. When new information was released to the market, the true economic impact of such 
information was quickly and completely reflected on a firm’s stock price [Fama, 1970].
7
 Brown and Warner [1985] 
showed that the value adjustment process by the stock market would include any expected cost and benefit related 
to the new information.  
The third assumption pertaining to potential confounding effects is quite important although it can be substantially 
addressed by choosing a very short event window, which we use in this study.
8 
 In essence, we assume that there 
are no other major confounding events such as the declaration of dividends, stock buy-backs, merger 
announcements, product announcements, or any impending forms of litigation. While such events cannot possibly 
be ruled out for each and every firm in our sample, it is highly unlikely that such effects would appear in any 
consistent pattern within our fairly short event window to impact our results.     
Brown and Warner [1980, 1985] and MacKinlay [1997] provide a comprehensive review of event-study methodology 
and articulate several essential steps for the successful implementation of this approach. First, normal or expected 
                                                     
3
 We used several terms including “breaches,” “security breaches,” “security incidents.” “data loss,” and “Internet breach incidents.”  
4
 For instance, a security breach at Citibank was reported close to midnight on Friday, June 8, 2011, by Reuters. This was followed by a spate of 
announcements on Saturday. The event-study date for this incident was Monday, June 11, 2011, when the market opened.  
5
 mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
6
 Malkiel [2003] provides a comprehensive review of the efficient market hypothesis with supporting evidence of its robustness and centrality to 
our financial markets. 
7
 Ball and Brown [1968] investigated the impact of earnings announcements on security prices and Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll [1969] 
examined the market reaction to stock splits. 
8
 The longer the event window, the more difficult it would be to control for events that might cause a confounding effect.  
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return performance for the firm must be reliably estimated. We use the three Fama-French [1993] factors plus the 
momentum factor in estimating expected returns: 
tttt
BillT
tt UMDHMLSMBRMRFRR  

4321   
where Rt is the return on security in period t, Rt
T-Bill
 is the return on U.S. Treasury bills in month t, and RMRFt is the 
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio minus the U.S. T-bill rate. The SMBt and HMLt are the Fama-French factors 
that represent the small firm premium and the value premium, respectively, and UMD is the Carhart [1997] 
momentum factor that takes into account risk related to return persistence.
9 
 
Having estimated the expected return, abnormal returns can then be calculated by subtracting the normal return 
from the actual return, such that ARit = Kit – Rit, where ARit is the abnormal return on security i in period t and Kit is 
the actual return on security i in period t. We have chosen the length of the estimation window (255 days) to be 
sufficiently long such that, under the null hypothesis, the distribution of the sample abnormal returns of a given 
observation in the event window is approximately normally distributed: 
))(,0( 2 itit ARAR  . The next step is to 












   
Although the event-study structure is relatively simple to implement, some statistical issues need to be carefully 
considered, especially when the event window is long (typically greater than twelve months). Kothari and Warner 
[1997, 2007] show that long-horizon studies typically lack the ability to detect abnormal performance and are 
particularly sensitive to the return generating process. However, short-horizon studies like the one we used in this 
article generally do not suffer from these limitations. 
Since our primary focus was to examine the economic effect of enacting security breach notification laws on the 
documented negative market reaction to security breach announcements, we measured the impact of security 
breach announcements on firm value in the period prior to June 30, 2006, and again during the period after June 30, 
2006. This date was a threshold in enacting breach notification laws; before this point, states were deliberate in 
enacting such laws, and after it most states rapidly adopted these laws. While it is not possible to identify a single 
date before which all states or after which all states enacted security breach notification laws, we note that before 
June 30, 2006, only sixteen states enacted such laws, whereas after that date forty-three states enacted such 
laws.
10
 Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the impact of the enactment of these laws will be substantially reflected 
on the period after June 30, 2006, with insignificant effect, if any, reflected in the period prior to June 30, 2006. Using 
this as a cutoff date, we split our breach sample into two roughly equal data sets of about one-hundred incidents, 
which allowed us to get significant results in the before and after period. 
Other possible sources of bias that can impact event-study results include non-synchronous trading, thinly traded 
securities, and some further liquidity issues related to small capitalization stocks. Fortunately, our sample was made 
up of mostly large firms that were actively traded on major exchanges. The average market capitalization of firms in 
our sample as of December 31, 2008, was $31.56 billion and the average beta for firms in the sample was 1.25. 
Finally, the choice of the appropriate market index was also critical. In our case, we used the CRSP value-weighted 
market index, which is the most comprehensive characterization of the U.S. equity markets.  
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Impact of Security Breaches Over Entire Sample Period 
We used Eventus software for the event-study procedure in which we employed information on security breach 
incidents gathered in our database along with daily price information on each of the impacted firms obtained from 
                                                     
9
 The four factor market model is the premier return generating model used in estimating expected equity returns. The CRSP value-weighted 
market index is the most comprehensive representation of the U.S. equity markets. Further, the model adjusts for the size effect, the value 
premium, and the momentum effect, the three market anomalies empirically established in the finance literature.  
10
 Henderson [1990] shows that although an event date is uncertain and in many cases may be impossible to identify precisely, the event 
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CRSP.
11 
The precise date in which the investing public was made aware of the security breach was of utmost 
importance in event-study analysis. While we have identified over 298 security breach incidents, we were able to 
identify an exact announcement date and obtain complete information for only 201 of the incidents, which 
constituted our final sample. 
The total number of 201 incidents in our sample occurred over the period from January 2001 through December 
2008. In order to study the impact of security breach notification laws on firms, we divided our sample of breach 
incidents into those that occurred prior to the enactment of the security notification laws and those that occurred 
after. Specifically, we divided the sample period into breaches that occurred before June 30, 2006, and those that 
occurred after June 30, 2006. We determined ninety-two breaches occurred between January 1, 2001, and June 30, 
2006, and 109 breaches were announced after June 30, 2006, until December 31, 2008.     
Before we turned our attention to examining the impact of the security breach notification laws on the two 
subperiods, we conducted a base case scenario which included all breaches over the entire period. Table 1 
presents the average abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the entire sample of 201 observations 
estimated using the four factor market model. We estimated the normal model parameters using the 255 days prior 
to the event period, and then estimated AAR for (–30) days prior to the event and (+30) days after the event. The 
residuals were tested over a five-day event window prior to the event and two days after the event. It is important to 
note the increased number of significant negative abnormal residuals in the few days surrounding the event, which 
generated significant cumulative negative abnormal returns. This indicated the presence of important economic 
information that was being shown to the market. 
In general, we observe a statistically significant negative AAR and CAR around the event date. A Patel Z value 
greater than 2 indicates that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The results 
show that in the three days surrounding the breach event, we found negative and statistically significant abnormal 
returns. Moreover, the results indicate that there is a negative effect on the returns of these firms on the day of the 
event and a highly significant negative impact occurring on the day following the breach incident. Our results are 
consistent with the literature regarding the negative market impact on firm value surrounding announcements of 
security breach incidents. 
The significant cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the event date used in Table 1 show that the market 
anticipated the security breaches and reacted negatively to that information, as indicated by an average decline in 
the stock price of these firms. Such a negative reaction is characteristic of bad news. After these reports, investors 
will be concerned about the extent of the financial damage that might result from the security breach. Once the news 
of the breach is out, it is vital for firms to alleviate such fears and uncertainty by clearly delineating the extent of the 
breach and their immediate and long-term response to it.  
Figure 1 depicts the behavior of both the AAR and the CAR for the four factor model residuals. There is clear 
evidence of a significant drop in the cumulative abnormal returns immediately prior to the announcement date. The 
magnitude of this cumulative decline in the abnormal returns around the announcement of the security breach is 
shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 to be in the order of 0.7 percent. This decline in the cumulative abnormal returns 
culminated from the significant negative average abnormal returns in the few days immediately preceding the 
incident. As expected, the average residuals returned to their normalcy immediately after the incident.
12
 
Impact of Security Breaches Prior to Enactment of Notification Laws 
After establishing the results for the impact of security breach announcements on the market value of firms for the 
entire period, we next focused on the period of January 1, 2001–June 30, 2006, which was the period prior to the 
enactment of state and federal security breach notification laws.
13
 Table 2 and Figure 2 present the results for the 
ninety-two security breach incidents that occurred in that period. Essentially, the results were fairly similar, although 
more pronounced than the results for the entire period. The decline in the market value of firms during that period is 
shown in Table 2 and Figure 2 to be in the order of 1 percent of the market value of breached firms, which is higher 
than the estimated decline in the market value of firms (of 0.7 percent) when the entire period is considered. 
 
                                                     
11
 Eventus is a product of Cowan Research LC (http://www.eventstudy.com). 
12
 It is significant to note that it takes about seven to eight days for the cumulative average residuals to return to the zero mean, suggesting that 
the full impact of security breach incidents remained for about a week after the event. 
13
 While it is true that some states enacted the breach notification laws prior to that date, they were few in number and their impact on the total 
sample of firms breached across the country during that period is likely to be insignificant.  
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Table 1: Abnormal Residuals for Security Breach Announcements 
During Entire Sample Period, 2001-2008 
The data show the average abnormal market model residuals and cumulative 
abnormal residuals for thirty days prior and thirty days after the 
announcement of a corporate security breach event. The results are for 201 
security breaches that were announced during the period 2001 to 2008. Two 
asterisks indicate that average residuals are significantly different from zero 
at the 5 percent level. 
Day Average 
Residual 
CAR Patel Z Day Average 
Residual 
CAR Patel Z 
-30 -0.24% -0.24% -1.910 1 -0.24% -0.63% -2.948** 
-29 0.15% -0.09% 1.247 2 0.11% -0.52% 0.914 
-28 -0.06% -0.15% -0.511 3 -0.05% -0.57% -0.406 
-27 0.06% -0.09% 0.528 4 0.08% -0.49% -0.700 
-26 -0.09% -0.18% -0.802 5 -0.01% -0.50% -0.073 
-25 0.05% -0.13% 0.426 6 -0.03% -0.53% -0.296 
-24 -0.12% -0.25% -1.034 7 0.14% -0.39% 1.173 
-23 0.15% -0.10% 1.276 8 0.19% -0.20% 1.463 
-22 0.16% 0.06% 1.405 9 0.13% -0.07% -1.361 
-21 0.08% 0.14% 0.712 10 -0.04% -0.11% -0.320 
-20 -0.01% 0.13% -0.049 11 0.08% -0.03% 0.674 
-19 -0.04% 0.09% -1.031 12 -0.05% -0.08% -0.400 
-18 -0.02% 0.07% -0.160 13 0.06% -0.02% -0.551 
-17 0.07% 0.14% 0.602 14 -0.08% -0.10% -0.648 
-16 0.01% 0.15% 0.125 15 0.13% 0.03% 1.136 
-15 0.00% 0.15% 0.025 16 -0.09% -0.06% -1.621 
-14 0.07% 0.22% 0.573 17 -0.09% -0.15% -0.767 
-13 -0.18% 0.04% -1.903 18 0.05% -0.10% 0.395 
-12 -0.01% 0.03% -0.114 19 0.13% 0.03% 1.095 
-11 -0.14% -0.11% -1.163 20 -0.07% -0.04% -1.302 
-10 0.06% -0.05% 0.558 21 -0.13% -0.17% -1.105 
-9 -0.05% -0.10% -0.455 22 0.05% -0.12% 0.991 
-8 0.12% 0.02% 1.031 23 0.14% 0.02% 1.237 
-7 0.01% 0.03% 0.075 24 0.09% 0.11% 0.790 
-6 0.01% 0.04% 0.114 25 -0.06% 0.05% -0.540 
-5 0.12% 0.16% 1.007 26 -0.20% -0.15% -1.721 
-4 -0.05% 0.11% -0.401 27 -0.03% -0.18% -0.236 
-3 -0.05% 0.06% -0.433 28 -0.06% -0.24% -0.550 
-2 0.11% -0.09% 0.970 29 0.08% -0.16% 0.659 
-1 -0.26% -0.20% -
3.942** 
30 0.01% -0.15% 0.057 
0 -0.30% -0.39% -
2.601** 
    
 
 
Figure 1.  Average and Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around the Security Breach Events 
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Table 2: Abnormal Residuals Prior to Breach Notification Laws 
 (Four Factor Market Model) 
The data show the average abnormal four factor market model residuals and 
cumulative abnormal residuals for thirty days prior and thirty days after the 
announcement of a corporate security breach event. The results are for ninety-two 
breaches that occurred during the period from January 1, 2001, to June 30, 2006, 
prior to enactment of security breach notification laws in most states. Asterisks 
indicate that the average residual is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. 
Day AAR CAR  Patel Z Day AAR CAR  Patel Z 
-30 -0.16% -0.16% -1.282 1 0.07% -0.90% 0.571 
-29 0.13% -0.03% 1.025 2 -0.02% -0.92% -0.115 
-28 0.01% -0.02% 0.084 3 0.13% -0.79% -0.994 
-27 -0.11% -0.14% -1.033 4 0.01% -0.78% 0.057 
-26 -0.06% -0.20% -1.235 5 0.14% -0.64% 1.055 
-25 -0.12% -0.32% -0.886 6 0.30% -0.34% -1.776 
-24 0.17% -0.15% -1.339 7 0.19% -0.15% 0.728 
-23 0.02% -0.13% 0.144 8 0.19% 0.04% 1.578 
-22 0.17% 0.04% 1.342 9 -0.16% -0.12% -1.247 
-21 -0.10% -0.06% -0.751 10 0.14% 0.02% 1.062 
-20 0.12% 0.06% -0.912 11 0.04% 0.06% 0.335 
-19 -0.12% -0.06% -0.95 12 -0.17% -0.11% -1.269 
-18 -0.10% -0.16% -0.764 13 0.11% 0.00% 0.859 
-17 0.04% -0.12% 0.336 14 0.12% 0.12% 0.932 
-16 0.03% -0.09% 0.195 15 -0.07% 0.05% -0.533 
-15 0.01% -0.08% 0.056 16 -0.04% 0.01% -0.332 
-14 -0.15% -0.23% -1.164 17 0.04% 0.05% 0.297 
-13 -0.13% -0.36% -1.036 18 -0.04% 0.01% -0.335 
-12 0.15% -0.21% 1.116 19 -0.09% -0.08% -0.728 
-11 -0.20% -0.41% -1.497 20 -0.15% -0.23% -1.149 
-10 0.09% -0.32% 0.721 21 0.18% -0.05% -1.388 
-9 -0.03% -0.35% -0.22 22 0.20% 0.15% 1.513$ 
-8 0.12% -0.23% 0.893 23 -0.02% 0.13% -0.185 
-7 0.15% -0.08% 1.129 24 0.10% 0.23% 0.766 
-6 0.06% -0.02% 0.458 25 -0.02% 0.21% -0.14 
-5 -0.02% -0.04% -0.128 26 0.00% 0.21% -0.037 
-4 0.08% 0.04% -0.612 27 -0.12% 0.09% -1.655 
-3 -0.14% -0.10% 0.269 28 0.17% 0.26% 1.317 
-2 -0.35% -0.45% -4.067*** 29 0.06% 0.32% 0.475 
-1 -0.40% -0.85% -3.071** 30 -0.10% 0.22% -0.73 
0 -0.12% -0.97% -0.155         
 
 
Figure 2. Average and Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Security Breach Events 
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Impact of Security Breaches After Enactment of Notification Laws 
We repeated the same procedure used in estimating the impact of security breach announcements for the security 
breaches that occurred after June 30, 2006, marking the enactment of the security breach notification laws. There 
were 109 breaches during the period from June 30, 2006, through December 31, 2008, which was the period after 
the enactment of the notification laws. It is interesting to note that the number of breach announcements that 
occurred in the past three years was more than the breach announcements that occurred in the prior seven years. 
Table 3 and Figure 3 report the event-study results using the four factor market model to estimate the abnormal 
residuals. The results for this latter sample period appeared to be markedly different. While we still observed a 
statistically significant decline in the CAR on the event date (day 0), the overall market reaction was measurably 
reduced relative to what was documented in the earlier period. More specifically, during this time period in which we 
expected to observe the full impact of the enactment of the security breach notification laws, we found from Table 3 
that the estimated decline in the market value of firms following an announcement of a security breach was only in 
the order of 0.5 percent of its market value.
14
 
Table 3: Abnormal Residuals after Breach Notification Laws (Four 
Factor Market Model) 
 The data show the average abnormal four factor market model residuals 
and cumulative abnormal residuals for thirty days prior and thirty days after 
the announcement of a corporate security breach event. The results are for 
109 breaches that occurred during the period from June 30, 2006, to 
December 31, 2008, after the enactment of security breach notification laws 
in most states. Asterisks indicate that the average residual is significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
  Day AAR CAR  Patel Z Day AAR CAR  Patel Z 
-30 -0.14% -0.14% -1.592 1 0.13% -0.41% -1.572 
-29 0.15% 0.01% 0.826 2 0.21% -0.20% 1.114 
-28 -0.12% -0.11% -0.634 3 0.12% -0.08% 0.119 
-27 0.23% 0.12% 1.211 4 0.12% 0.04% -0.834 
-26 -0.04% 0.08% -0.193 5 -0.13% -0.09% -0.702 
-25 0.19% 0.27% 1.008 6 0.09% 0.00% 0.996 
-24 -0.07% 0.20% -0.398 7 -0.01% -0.01% 0.915 
-23 0.01% 0.21% 1.376 8 0.14% 0.13% 1.893 
-22 -0.15% 0.06% 0.821 9 -0.08% 0.04% -1.513 
-21 -0.12% -0.06% 1.255 10 -0.19% -0.15% -0.99 
-20 -0.09% -0.15% 0.48 11 0.11% -0.04% 0.575 
-19 -0.11% -0.26% -1.767 12 0.05% 0.01% 0.287 
-18 0.05% -0.21% 0.265 13 -0.16% -0.15% -1.135 
-17 0.09% -0.12% 0.492 14 -0.02% -0.17% -1.297 
-16 0.01% -0.11% 0.029 15 0.01% -0.16% 1.62 
-15 -0.12% -0.23% -0.004 16 0.03% -0.13% -1.666 
-14 0.15% -0.08% 1.339 17 0.01% -0.11% -1.058 
-13 -0.16% -0.24% -1.638 18 0.12% 0.01% 0.652 
-12 0.15% -0.09% -0.785 19 0.22% 0.23% 1.69 
-11 -0.08% -0.17% -0.453 20 -0.14% 0.09% -1.965 
-10 0.04% -0.13% 0.215 21 -0.08% 0.01% -0.448 
-9 0.07% -0.06% -0.391 22 0.20% 0.21% 1.546 
-8 0.12% 0.06% 0.655 23 -0.20% 0.01% 1.531 
-7 -0.11% -0.05% -0.577 24 -0.09% -0.08% 0.453 
-6 -0.08% -0.13% -0.138 25 0.10% 0.02% -0.54 
-5 0.19% 0.06% 1.227 26 -0.07% -0.05% -1.472 
-4 -0.02% 0.04% -0.1 27 0.16% 0.11% 0.846 
-3 -0.01% 0.03% -0.654 28 -0.17% -0.06% -1.433 
-2 -0.12% -0.10% -0.775 29 0.09% 0.03% 0.477 
-1 -0.10% -0.20% -2.125* 30 0.09% 0.12% 0.506 
0 -0.34% -0.54% -2.885**         
                                                     
14
 A t-test of differences in means with unequal variance indicated that the difference between the decline in the market value of firms after June 
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Figure 3. Average and Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Security Breach Events for the 
Period After the Enactment of Enforcement Laws, June 30, 2006, to December 31, 2008 
 
To put these results in the proper perspective, we should point out that our results for the overall period regarding 
the negative impact on firm value due to breach announcements is already lower than the average decline in market 
value of firms documented in earlier studies. Since some of these earlier studies used similar methodologies, it is 
reasonable to argue that our results for the overall period are also somewhat muted since they incorporate many of 
the breaches that occurred in the later period when security breach legislation was already enacted. Consequently, 
our findings that the negative impact of security breach announcements on the market value of firms has been 
reduced by the enactment of security notification laws corroborates earlier evidence and is consistent with our main 
contention.  
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The intended purpose for enacting the security breach state notification legislation is to encourage both public and 
private organizations to implement better security measures in order to protect consumer information. Security 
breach notification laws impose a reputational cost on firms by mandating a public disclosure of security breaches. 
The economic effects of these notification laws have not been examined in the literature. Using event-study 
methodology, this article measures the effectiveness of these laws by estimating the impact of security breach 
incidents on firm value during the periods before and after the enactment of security breach notification laws.  
Using a sample of over 200 breaches over the period 2001–2008, we found a statistically significant negative CAR 
in the order of 0.7 percent of firm value around the event date. The results showed negative and statistically 
significant abnormal returns in the three days surrounding the breach event. These findings corroborated other 
empirical evidence regarding the negative market impact on firm value surrounding announcements of security 
breach incidents. Moreover, such findings demonstrated the presence of significant economic incentives for firms to 
implement information security procedures.  
In order to examine the economic impact of the security breach notification laws that were enacted in the latter part 
of 2006, we divided our sample of breach incidents into those that occurred prior to the enactment of these laws and 
those that occurred after. We found that the estimated decline in market value of firms due to security breach 
announcements was larger during the period prior to the enactment of the security breach notification laws than 
during the entire sample period. The decline in the market value of breached firms during the period prior to the 
enactment of notification laws was in the order of 1 percent, which was higher than the estimated decline in the 
market value of firms (of 0.7 percent) throughout the entire period.   
For the period after the enactment of the notification laws, the results appeared to be significantly different. While we 
still observed a statistically significant decline in the CAR on the event date (day 0), the overall market reaction was 
measurably reduced relative to what was documented for the earlier period. In fact, the estimated decline in the 
market value of firms following an announcement of a security breach after the enactment of security breach 
notification laws was in the order of 0.5 percent of its market value, almost half the impact observed prior to the 
enactment of these security notification laws. 
The reduced negative impact of security breach announcements on the market value of firms after the enactment of 
security notification laws provided some evidence in favor of the federal and state security breach notification 
legislation. Since the intended objective for enacting the state notification legislation was to encourage firms to 
implement better security measures, our findings of reduced negative impact on firm value was generally consistent 
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with the intended purpose of the legislation. It is also possible to conjecture that firms may have invested more 
resources in reducing the impact, if not the incidence, of security breaches.  
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APPENDIX A: EFFECTIVE ADOPTION DATES OF SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION 
LAWS BY STATE 
Table A–1: Effective Adoption Dates of Security Breach Notification Laws 
by State 










North Dakota 6/1/2005 
 
Hawaii       1/1/2007 
Delaware 6/28/2005 
 













North Carolina 12/1/2005 
 
Wyoming 7/1/2007 


























South Carolina 7/1/2009 

















New Mexico N/A 
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